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INTRODUCTION
To students of Civil Procedure, and those like me who teach them,
the “minimum contacts” test that International Shoe Co. v. Washington1
announced is seen as the beginning of time for evaluating the
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constitutionality of state court and (by application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure2) most federal court assertions of personal jurisdiction.
Some meanies like me make students read Pennoyer v. Neff,3 which they
generally find impenetrable. Particularly since Pennoyer was sort of
overruled, at least in part,4 students (who then become lawyers and judges)
are left with the notion that Pennoyer was the case that, by invoking the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,5 turned personal
jurisdiction into a constitutional subject.6 I have argued at length that this
is a debatable proposition.7
For quite awhile, we teachers didn’t have anything new to cover
when it came to the minimum contacts test. Until 2011, the last decision
in which a majority of Supreme Court justices discussed the minimum
contacts test was in the splintered opinions in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court,8 where the Court divided four to four on the question of
whether a component manufacturer generally could be sued in a state in
which the component was foreseeably resold as part of a finished product.
Four Justices said the answer to that question is usually yes,9 four said
usually no,10 and Justice Stevens wouldn’t say one way or the other.11
Remarkably, the Court ruled unanimously that the component
manufacturer wasn’t subject to jurisdiction because it would be
unreasonable to do so even if there were minimum contacts.12
The lack of clarity left matters in a less-than-ideal position, but the
Supreme Court said nothing on the topic for a quarter century. The closest
the Court came was a 1990 decision reaffirming in-state service of process
on an individual defendant as a basis for jurisdiction; four Justices in the
concurrence purported to do a minimum contacts analysis, but it wasn’t a
majority opinion.13

2

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4
See Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186, 214 n.39 (1977).
5 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
7 Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction;
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 38–43 (1990).
8 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
9 Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
10 Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
11 Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“An
examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state
courts assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional.”).
12 Id. at 116 (O’Connor, J.).
13
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 636–39 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment).
3
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Then, in 2011, the Supreme Court showed interest in the subject
again, deciding four cases from 2011 to 2014. In all four cases, the Court
ruled that the minimum contacts test was not fulfilled.14 The result in three
of the cases was utterly predictable, as the Court unanimously held that the
minimum contacts test was not fulfilled.15 Justice Sotomayor, in the fourth
case, authored a concurrence,16 thus breaking up the Court’s otherwise
blissful agreement on both rationale and result. All three of the unanimous
cases represented wild over-reaches of long-arm jurisdiction by lower
courts, and the Supreme Court appeared to take the cases mostly as handslapping exercises.
The most interesting case of the four produced the only nonunanimous decision. In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,17 it
looked as though the Court might resolve the long-simmering debate as to
the scope of the stream-of-commerce test for product liability cases that
Asahi left undecided. As commentators have noted,18 the Court did no
such thing. If anything, the Court achieved the remarkable feat of further
confusing the issue by splitting four to two to three on the rationale.19
Strangely, this left Justice Breyer’s two-vote concurrence in the judgment
as the controlling opinion, but his opinion is so narrow it leaves little for
lower courts to follow.20
Although many find this surprising, in terms of the results reached,
the jurisdictional landscape today is not much changed from the preInternational Shoe days when the “implied consent” rubric was the
rationale for asserting jurisdiction. In fact, in some ways the minimum
contacts test as now applied is less flexible than the old implied consent
theory. To be sure, some things have changed. The collapsing of in rem
14

Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746
(2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
15 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1115; Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 746; Goodyear Dunlop Tire
Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2846.
16 See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
17 131 S. Ct. at 2780.
18 See e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence
of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245 (2011); see also Shane
Yeargan, Note, Purpose and Intent: Seeking a More Consistent Approach to Stream of
Commerce Personal Jurisdiction, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 543, 555–56 (2012) (“The Court
in J. McIntyre largely disappointed those who had hope for clarification of the law of
stream of commerce jurisdiction.”); Robert M. Pollack, Note, “Not of Any Particular
State,” J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Nonspecific Purposeful Availment, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1088, 1103 (2014) (J. McIntyre’s “splintered decision failed to settle
[stream-of-commerce] doctrine.”).
19
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780.
20 Borchers, supra note 18, at 1265.

4

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1

into in personam jurisdiction21 is a genuine change from the preInternational Shoe days, though one that has constricted state-court reach.
But when it comes to the fundamentals of jurisdiction in tort and contract
cases and assertions of jurisdiction over corporations, the picture today –
at least from the standpoint of outcomes – looks remarkably unchanged
from (perhaps is even more grudging than) the pre-International Shoe era.
Given the Supreme Court’s adherence to the minimum contacts
language for seventy years now, it seems unlikely that the vocabulary will
soon change. The question rather is whether the vocabulary will continue
to be a cloak to hide jurisdictional doctrine that is in truth no less rigid than
that of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The minimum contacts
test is in its twilight because it has become almost completely separated
from the fairness rationale that underlay the test as it was originally
conceived. So while the minimum contacts language will almost certainly
persist, the test as a meaningful exposition of the Due Process Clause may
not live to see the next dawn, if indeed it is still alive at all.
Part I will briefly review the Supreme Court’s four new cases. Part
II will survey the jurisdictional landscape as it existed before International
Shoe was decided in 1945. Finally, Part III offers a modest proposal to
return the test to its basic fairness origins.
I. THE COURT’S RESURGENT INTEREST IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Because each new personal jurisdiction opinion begets a flood of
commentary, I will endeavor to be as brief as possible in recounting the
new decisions. In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,22 the Supreme
Court faced a product liability action that an injured industrial worker
brought against the English manufacturer of the allegedly defective
machine that caused the accident.23 Because the machine had not been
sold directly to a buyer in the plaintiff’s home state of New Jersey, but
rather through an Ohio-based independent distributor, the case presented
a question of stream-of-commerce jurisdiction.24 Justice Kennedy
authored a four-vote plurality opinion which held that there was no
jurisdiction because of a lack of a direct effort to serve the forum state
market.25 The plurality noted the absence of any evidence in the record
21

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780.
23 Id. at 2786.
24 Id. at 2788 (The stream of commerce “refers to the movement of goods from
manufacturers through distributors to consumers, yet beyond that descriptive purpose its
meaning is far from exact.”).
25 Id. at 2790–91.
22
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that the English manufacturer was specifically targeting the forum state.26
The plurality also attempted to revive the sovereignty strand of jurisdiction
– that is, the notion that jurisdictional limits exist in part to check the
breadth of state authority—which has appeared episodically in Supreme
Court opinions.27 The plurality reasoned that while one function of
jurisdiction is to protect defendants from unfair assertions of jurisdiction,
another was to constrain the sovereignty of states.28
Justice Breyer’s controlling opinion,29 concurring in the judgment—
joined only by Justice Alito—refused to endorse the plurality’s broad
rationale.30 Justice Breyer emphasized that the record showed that only
one such machine had been sold in New Jersey.31 Purporting to adhere
closely to the Court’s minimum contacts precedents, the concurrence in
the judgment reasoned that one drop could not fill the metaphorical
streambed needed to keep afloat an assertion of jurisdiction.32 Justice
Breyer saw the J. McIntyre facts as similar to those in World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson,33 in which the Court ruled that the injury state
did not have jurisdiction over an out-of-state seller of a car, because the
car dealership (and its regional distributor) had made no effort to serve the
forum state’s market.34
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion vehemently rejected the
plurality’s sovereignty rationale.35 She emphasized that the English
manufacturer saw the United States as a single market and that the sale of
a machine in New Jersey was utterly foreseeable.36 She also emphasized
the unfairness of leaving the injured worker with no practical forum in
which to pursue his case and, in her view, the absurdity of giving what

26

Id.
Id. at 2787–87; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
292 (1980).
28
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787.
29 See supra note 18–20 and accompanying text.
30 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
31 Id. at 2791–92.
32 Id. at 2792 (“a single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an adequate
basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant places
his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take
place”).
33 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
34 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 29798).
35 Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“the constitutional limits on a state court’s
adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state sovereignty”).
36 Id. at 2801.
27
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amounted to jurisdictional immunity to the English manufacturer when the
manufacturer’s home European jurisdictional scheme would not do so.37
In Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown,38 decided on
the same day as J. McIntyre, the Court confronted a case in which two
boys who were members of a soccer team were killed in France, allegedly
as the result of a defect in a tire manufactured by one of several foreign
subsidiaries of the U.S. tire giant Goodyear.39 A court in North Carolina
– the boys’ home state – took jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries
based on a very small percentage of their tires being sold in North
Carolina.40 This was an attempted exercise of “general” or “all-purpose”
jurisdiction, because the forum-state sales were unrelated to the claims.41
Goodyear was only the third time in the minimum contacts era that the
Court had decided a general jurisdiction case, and only the second since
its six-decades-old opinion in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co.42
Goodyear’s brief and unanimous opinion held that the North
Carolina courts had reached too far.43 The Court relied heavily on its
earlier decision holding that unrelated forum-state purchases by a
corporate defendant could not sustain jurisdiction.44 The real news from
the Goodyear decision was that the Court formulated a test for deciding
whether unrelated contacts met the constitutional threshold. The Court
stated that a defendant must have contacts with the forum that make it
“essentially at home” there.45 That new test prompted a fair amount of
speculation, with some reading it as limiting jurisdiction to a
“headquarters” paradigm,46 and others arguing that while the Court’s
37

Id.
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
39 Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011).
40 Id. at 2851.
41 Id. at 2854 (“To justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over petitioners, North
Carolina courts relied on the petitioners’ placement of their tires in the ‘stream of
commerce.’”).
42 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Although it is a debatable reading of the opinion, the Court
treated Perkins as standing for the proposition that a corporation is subject to general
personal jurisdiction in the state in which it has its headquarters. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct.
at 2856.
43 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
44 Id. at 2856 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
418 (1984)).
45 Id. at 2851.
46 Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed Opportunities in
Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union Brussels I
Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 1, 4 (2014) (“If what the Court means by
‘essentially at home’ is that the corporate defendant has its headquarters in the forum, U.S.
38
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opinion required a meaningful and permanent connection with the forum,
it did not limit general jurisdiction to the defendant’s home base.47
Three years later brought another pair of jurisdictional opinions, both
reversing extremely aggressive attempted assertions of jurisdiction
endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.48 In
Walden v. Fiore, the defendant (who had been deputized to work for the
federal Drug Enforcement Agency) seized about $97,000 in cash from two
professional gamblers as they passed through Atlanta, Georgia’s airport
on their way home to Nevada.49 Apparently the defendant believed that
the money might be tied to a drug transaction and some months later
helped draft a “probable cause” affidavit in support of a forfeiture action.50
However, no forfeiture action was ever filed, and a few months later the
gamblers had the money returned to them.51
The gamblers brought a Bivens action52 in Nevada against the federal
official. The District Court concluded that there was no jurisdiction over
the Georgia-based defendant, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed.53 The Ninth Circuit’s theory54 was that the defendant’s
knowledge that the plaintiffs were Nevadans created minimum contacts
with Nevada, particularly based on his later actions in helping to draft the
affidavit.55 The plaintiffs and the Ninth Circuit leaned heavily on the

plaintiffs could find themselves irrationally disadvantaged in pursuing cases against
foreign corporate defendants.”); Meir Feder, Goodyear “Home,” and the Uncertain Future
of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV 671, 677 (2012) (“[T]he Goodyear opinion
did include several clues suggesting that the Court may have intended the at home standard
as a narrow one, perhaps extending no further than a corporation’s state of incorporation
and principal place of business.”).
47 Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the Due-Process Contours of
General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 49 (2012).
48 Symposium, Ninth Circuit Conference: U.S. Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth
Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341 (2006) (Over the past fifty years, the Ninth Circuit has been
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court an average of 10.78 times per term. In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit was reversed an average of 7.42 times.).
49 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1120.
52 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971)
(recognizing a civil cause of action under the Constitution against federal officers who
deprive citizens of constitutional rights). In Walden v. Fiore, the plaintiffs alleged a
violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 134 U.S.
at 1120.
53 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1120.
54 Id. (“[P]etitioner ‘expressly aimed’ his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at
Nevada by submitting the affidavit with knowledge that it would affect persons with a
‘significant connection’ to Nevada.”)
55 Id.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones,56 where a famous entertainer
successfully prosecuted an action in her home state of California against a
writer and editor for the nationally circulated publication The National
Enquirer, which the plaintiff alleged ran a libelous story about her.57
The unanimous Court had little trouble dispatching the analogy to
Calder.58 The Court noted that the Calder opinion described California as
the “focal point” of the story.59 The wide circulation of the publication in
California, and the fact that the plaintiff’s reputation was centered there,
rendered the forum state effects in Calder much more substantial than in
Walden.60 As the Court noted, the Walden case bore some similarities to
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,61 in which the plaintiffs—not the
defendants—created the relationship to the forum.62 The Court repeated
several times that the contacts of the plaintiffs with the forum are by
themselves irrelevant; it is essential that each defendant voluntarily create
a relationship with the forum state.63
Although Walden may prove to be the least consequential of the
opinions, the opinion contains some stray language that might prove
nettlesome. In a sentence that defendants are sure to quote frequently
when attempting to dismiss actions, the Court stated: “[O]ur ‘minimum
contacts’ analysis looks at the defendant’s contacts with the forum state
itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”64
Taken out of context, this sentence might seem to announce a rule that
dealings with forum-state plaintiffs could never suffice and that the
minimum contacts test requires some additional connection to the forum
state. Such a rule, however, could not be squared with cases such as
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz65 and McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.66 in which the defendant’s sole connection to the forum was
a contractual relationship with a forum-based plaintiff.

56

465 U.S. 783 (1983).
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 783).
58 Id. at 1125.
59 Id. at 1123 (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789).
60 Id. at 1125.
61 Id., at 1123 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
62 Id. (“Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the
liberty of the nonresident defendant — not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”).
63 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (“A forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an outof-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on intentional conduct by the defendant that
creates the necessary contacts with the forum.”).
64 Id. at 1122.
65
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
66 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
57
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More likely what the Court was emphasizing was that the
relationship was formed and the vast majority of their interactions took
place outside the forum, and the forum became of significance only once
the plaintiffs returned to Nevada and demanded the money.67 As the Court
noted, if the plaintiffs’ injury was deprivation of the use of the money, the
injury could have arisen in any state to which the plaintiffs chose to travel
and demanded the money.68
If one squints to see anything else of doctrinal significance, it lies in
the Court’s footnote leaving to another day the question of the significance
of virtual contacts.69 The plaintiffs argued that denying them access to a
Nevada forum could have the unintended consequence of denying a
reasonable forum to plaintiffs injured over the Internet, perhaps by
fraudulent schemes or “phishing.”70 As did Justice Breyer’s opinion
concurring in the judgment in J. McIntyre, the Court expressly left
“questions about virtual contacts for another day.”71
The most audacious effort at asserting jurisdiction was the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion that was reversed in Daimler AG v. Bauman.72 In
Daimler, the plaintiffs were citizens of Argentina who alleged that they or
close relatives were victims of Argentina’s “Dirty War” that lasted from
1976 to 1983.73 The corporate defendant was Daimler, the German automanufacturing giant that makes Mercedes-Benz vehicles.74 The plaintiffs
brought a complaint in a California federal court alleging a variety of tort
theories claiming that Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary conspired with the
government to “kidnap, detain, torture, and kill plaintiffs and their
relatives . . . .”75
The plaintiffs’ theory of jurisdiction required several analytical leaps
ranging from the debatable to the highly implausible. First, the plaintiffs
67 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125 (“Respondents (and only respondents) lacked access to
their funds in Nevada not because anything independently occurred there, but because
Nevada is where respondents chose to be at a time when they desired to use the funds
seized by petitioner.”).
68 Id. (“Respondents would have experienced this same lack of access in California,
Mississippi, or wherever else they might have traveled and found themselves wanting more
money than they had.”).
69 Id. at 1125 n.9.
70 Id.
71 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792-93 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (questioning the potential idea of granting jurisdiction against
a company who instead of shipping product direct, cosigns through an intermediary such
as Amazon.com).
72 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
73 Id. at 751.
74
Id.
75 Id.
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alleged that Daimler was vicariously liable for the actions of its
Argentinian subsidiary.76 Second, the plaintiffs argued that Daimler’s
indirect U.S. subsidiary – Mercedes-Benz U.S.A. – had sufficient
unrelated contacts in California that it would be subject to general
jurisdiction in California.77 Third, the plaintiffs argued that Daimler
controlled its subsidiary to a sufficient degree that the subsidiary’s
contacts could be imputed to Daimler, rendering Daimler subject to
jurisdiction in California.78 Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that
Daimler’s contacts on their own sufficed to subject it to jurisdiction in
California.79 Fourth, the plaintiffs argued that despite the lack of any
connection between California and the events and the parties, the assertion
of jurisdiction could survive the Asahi reasonableness test.80
The District Court dismissed the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction, and at first the Ninth Circuit affirmed over the dissent of one
of the three members of the panel.81 In a remarkable turn of events,
without additional briefing or argument, the Ninth Circuit panel granted
plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing and reversed itself with an expanded
version of the dissent becoming the majority opinion.82 This time, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs’ theory that the contacts of
Daimler’s U.S. subsidiary could be imputed to it under an “agency”
theory.83 Daimler’s petition to have the case reheard en banc failed, but
eight judges dissented from the denial of the rehearing petition and filed a

76

Id. at 752.
Id. (arguing “[a]lthough [Mercedes-Benz USA’s] principal place of business is in
New Jersey, [Mercedes-Benz USA] has multiple California-based facilities, including a
regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center
in Irvine . . . . [Mercedes-Benz USA] is the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the
California market . . . . Over 10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States take
place in California, and [Mercedes-Benz USA] California sales account for 2.4% of
Daimler’s worldwide sales.”).
78
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746 (“plaintiffs maintained that jurisdiction over Daimler
could be founded on the California contacts of [Mercedes-Benz USA], a distinct corporate
entity that, according to plaintiffs, should be treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional
purposes”).
79 Id. (“plaintiffs submitted declarations and exhibits purporting to demonstrate the
presence of Daimler itself in California”).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 752–53; Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Reinhart, J., dissenting).
82 134 S. Ct. at 753; Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011).
83 Bauman, 644 F.3d at 924 (holding that because Mercedes-Benz USA’s services
were sufficiently important to DaimlerChrysler and DaimlerChrysler had the right to
control Mercedes-Benz USA’s activities, thus declaring Mercedes-Benz USA was
DaimlerChrysler’s agent for general jurisdictional purposes).
77
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written opinion.84 That dissent argued that the panel’s agency theory was
so broad that it would render almost every multinational corporation
subject to jurisdiction in every state.85
There was little doubt that the plaintiffs would lose in the Supreme
Court.86 However, the opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by seven other
Justices, adopted a theory that may roll the boundaries of general
jurisdiction back past even what one might have expected after the
announcement of the Goodyear “essentially at home” test.87 The Court
held Daimler to have conceded that its U.S. subsidiary was subject to
general jurisdiction in California, though it was careful to make clear the
U.S. subsidiary might not have been subject to jurisdiction had Daimler
pressed the point.88 The Court also accepted arguendo the Ninth Circuit
panel’s contention that the U.S. subsidiary’s contacts could be imputed to
Daimler.89 But, said the majority, just because the subsidiary is “at home”
in California doesn’t mean that Daimler the parent is.90
The majority adopted what Justice Sotomayor—in her solo
concurrence in the judgment—called a “proportionality” test.91 Despite
the fairly substantial contacts between the U.S. subsidiary and California
– multiple offices and extensive vehicle sales92 – when looked at from the
perspective of Daimler, it could not be at home in California because
Daimler had vastly more substantial contacts outside of California.93 The
majority’s rationale baffled Justice Sotomayor.94 How is it, Justice
Sotomayor wondered, that contacts sufficient to render the smaller
subsidiary subject to jurisdiction in California become insufficient simply
because a larger corporation has more contacts elsewhere?95 Justice
Sotomayor also argued that such a rationale was inconsistent with Perkins,
84

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753.
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 2011).
86 Borchers, supra note 46, at 14.
87 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
88
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 (noting that Daimler failed to object below to plaintiffs’
assertion that the California courts could exercise all-purpose jurisdiction over [MercedesBenz USA], and that the Court has not addressed whether a foreign corporation may be
subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state subsidiary).
89 Id. at 760.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
92 Id. at 752 (“[Mercedes-Benz USA] has multiple California-based facilities . . . Over
10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States take place in California . . . .”).
93 Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The problem the Court says,
is not that Daimler’s contacts with California are too few, but that its contacts with other
forums are too many.”).
94
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770.
95 Id. at 763–64.
85
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which upheld jurisdiction while describing the corporation’s contacts with
the forum state as being “limited.”96 Rather, Justice Sotomayor would
have decided the case in favor of Daimler based on the Asahi
reasonableness test because of the foreign parties and events.97
While Daimler was the most exorbitant attempt at exercising
jurisdiction, its rationale could well be the most far reaching of the four
decisions. While the majority insisted that it was not limiting general
jurisdiction over corporations to the states of incorporation and principal
places of business,98 it’s becoming increasingly difficult to believe that the
Court has not retracted contacts-based general jurisdiction to that point, or
something close to it. First, the Court emphasized that it was only
assuming that the U.S. subsidiary was subject to general jurisdiction in
California, despite the fact that most lower courts have held that the
presence of substantial physical offices is enough to subject a corporation
to general jurisdiction.99 Second, the Court’s proportionality test is clearly
an effort to ensure that even the largest of corporate defendants are subject
to jurisdiction in at most a few places. But, as Justice Sotomayor noted,
it’s difficult at best to glean from the Court’s opinion when the non-forum
contacts so overwhelm the forum-state contacts as to make the latter
insufficient for constitutional purposes.
II. THE JURISDICTIONAL WORLD BEFORE INTERNATIONAL SHOE
The Court begins most jurisdictional opinions these days with a
recitation of a truncated, mythical history in which the evil Pennoyer
decision turned the landscape into a petrified forest of rules of very limited
jurisdictional reach, but then the International Shoe Court heroically

96

Id. at 767–68 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
438 (1952)). The majority and Justice Sotomayor each devoted several lengthy footnotes
to arguing about whether Perkins could be fairly read as showing that the defendant
corporation in that case had substantial activities outside the forum state of Ohio. See, e.g.,
id at 768, n.9; see also id. at 756 n.8.
97 Id. at 773 (“I would reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the narrower ground that
the exercise of jurisdiction over Daimler would be unreasonable in any event.”). The
majority opinion also put some weight on Daimler’s foreign nationality and credited the
Solicitor General’s assertion that adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s view would strain
international relations and make it more difficult for the U.S. to negotiate judgmentrecognition treaties; see also id. at 763.
98 Id. at 760 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general
jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business;
it simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”).
99
See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 411 (5th ed. 2010).
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smashed through all of this by invention of the minimum contacts test.100
Reading this recounting, one imagines a pre-International Shoe world of
hapless plaintiffs left without any realistic judicial recourse unless they
happened to catch defendants in the forum to serve them.101 The problem
seemed particularly acute with regard to corporations, as the Court held
that in-state service of a corporate officer was not by itself sufficient to
confer jurisdiction.102
The pre-International Shoe reality was vastly more complicated,
however. For one thing, ambiguity persisted well past Pennoyer as to the
role of the Due Process Clause. Some courts took what the “expansive
view” and others the “limited view”103 of the Pennoyer opinion. The
expansive view is the familiar one to us today in which the Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit Clauses work in tandem under a unified standard
to limit assertions of jurisdiction (the role of the Due Process Clause) while
requiring the recognition of judgments from other states with a
constitutionally sufficient jurisdictional basis (the Full Faith and Credit
Clause’s role).104
However, doubt persisted until 1915 as to whether there was a
unified standard, with some state courts believing that they could enforce
a judgment against in-state assets even if the assertion of jurisdiction went
beyond the boundaries set by the U.S. Supreme Court.105 The lack of
clarity on this point was fueled by Supreme Court opinions involving
collateral attacks to state court judgments stating that they could be

100 See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011) (referring to International Shoe as “pathmarking”); see also J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786-87 (2011) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).
101 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
102
See, e.g., Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915);
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895); see Martinez v. Caribbean, No. 12-16043
2014 U.S. App. Lexis 16163 at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2014) (reaching the result that in-state
service of a corporate officer does not confer jurisdiction over the corporation, but
remarkably never cited the Supreme Court’s controlling decisions in Riverside and
Goldey).
103 Borchers, supra note 7, at 38–41.
104 Borchers, supra note 7, at 38–39 (“The expansive view of Pennoyer is that the court
intended for the due process clause to provide both a mechanism for challenging either
interstate or intrastate, state court assertions of personal jurisdiction, and the contents of
the jurisdiction rules themselves.”).
105 Jester v. Steam Packet Co., 131 N.C. 54 (1902); Pope v. Terre Haute Co., 87 N.Y.
137 (1881); see also Riverside, 237 U.S. 189 (sustaining a direct attack on a state court
judgment based on service on corporate officer within the forum on personal business).
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“questioned in a court of another government,”106 implying that a different
rule might apply in direct attack cases.107
But even with that ambiguity resolved in favor of the expansive view
in 1915 – thus unifying the standards for direct and collateral attacks on
state-court judgments108—jurisdictional doctrine of the time was not
nearly as ossified as one might imagine. In fact, many of the current
debates taking place within the context of the minimum contacts test bear
a remarkable resemblance to those in the pre-International Shoe
jurisdictional world.
As discussed below, one of the most important extensions of the
common law bases of jurisdiction, was the notion that corporations “doing
business” within a state were “present” there and thus could be served with
process and made subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of a state other
than their incorporation.109 As we shall see, International Shoe itself was
a fairly easy case for jurisdiction under the “doing business” test and –
read in context – its minimum contacts language was an effort to clarify
and systematize that test as applied to out-of-state corporations. In fact, it
was not finally resolved until the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in
Shaffer v. Heitner110 that the minimum contacts test even applied to
individual defendants.
Nor was the “doing business” test the only expansion of jurisdiction
that took place between Pennoyer and International Shoe. Statutes
creating jurisdiction over non-resident motorists involved in accidents
within the forum state’s borders created what we could call today specific
jurisdiction.111 Additionally most of the “satellite” bases of jurisdiction
survived International Shoe and carry over to today, with the notable
106

See Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass’n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15
(1907).
107 See also Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521 (1895) (noting that the New
York state law rule allowed for jurisdiction over a corporation merely by service on any
officer of the corporation even if not in the state on corporate business, the Court stated:
“Whatever effect a constructive service may be allowed in the courts of the same
government, it cannot be recognized as valid by the courts of any other government.”).
108 Riverside, 237 U.S. at 194–95 (“the courts of one state may not without violating
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, render a judgment against a
corporation organized under the laws of another State where such corporation has not come
into such State for the purpose of doing business therein . . . ”).
109 See infra notes 180–202 and accompanying text.
110 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.19 (1977).
111 The term adopted by the Supreme Court for cases in which the claim arises out of
or relates to forum-state activities. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984). The Supreme Court now also calls specific jurisdiction “caselinked.” See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011).
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exception of quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the attachment of property
unrelated to the dispute.
To be sure, that is not to say that nothing has changed postInternational Shoe. When the jurisdictional reach of courts hit its highwater mark with the Supreme Court’s decision in McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co.112 – a decision that held that the sale of a single life
insurance policy in the forum state created minimum contacts with the
corporate insurer – it appeared that the Constitution might fade into the
background as only a loose outer boundary on the power of states, much
as it did with regard to choice of law.113 The Supreme Court, however,
almost immediately post-McGee quashed that notion.114 Since then, the
jurisdictional boundaries permitted under the Constitution have been in
steady contraction.
The contraction has now reached the point where it’s worth asking
whether International Shoe still deserves the emphasis placed on it. It is
unlikely that the Court will abandon the minimum contacts language, but
the question worth asking is whether there really is anything left of the
minimum contacts test – at least conceived of as a mechanism for
promoting jurisdictional regime fundamentally guided by fairness.115
Assuming, as this article posits, that what now exists isn’t very different
in actual practice from the pre-International Shoe regime, and may be
more protective of defendants, one might wonder whether this is truly
progress.

112

355 U.S. 220 (1957).
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (affirming the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s decision to apply Minnesota substantive law to govern the effect of an
automobile insurance policy even though the accident did not occur in Minnesota, the
vehicle was not registered in Minnesota, and the plaintiff’s decedent did not live in
Minnesota).
114 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) ((“the requirements for personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, to the
flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington. But it is a mistake to assume
that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts.”) (citations omitted)).
115 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 323–24 (1945) ((“Due Process does permit
State courts to ‘enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred’ if it be found
‘reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice.’ And this in turn means that we will ‘permit’ the State to act if upon an ‘estimate
of the inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its
‘home’ or principal place of business, we conclude that it is ‘reasonable’ to subject it to
suit in a State where it is doing business.”) (emphasis added)).
113
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A. “Satellite” Bases of Jurisdiction
The United States law of personal jurisdiction has long allowed what
are sometimes called “satellite” bases of jurisdiction, that is, assertions of
jurisdiction that do not depend directly on what we now call contacts.116
There are several, and all but one survived into the post-International Shoe
world.
1. In-State Service
In-state service of process – sometimes called “transient service” or
“tag” jurisdiction117—on an individual defendant as a jurisdictional basis
has a long history in the United States. State courts inherited the rule from
the common law and applied it from nearly the birth of the United
States.118 The Pennoyer decision recognized it as the paradigmatic way in
which in personam jurisdiction could be obtained over individuals.119
It was heavily criticized in the post-International Shoe era as being
unnecessary and potentially unfair to defendants making only a brief visit
to the forum state.120 The argument ran that while in-state service might
have been a sensible basis when travel was more difficult, the rule was a
116

HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 392; see also Harold S. Lewis,
Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform
Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984) (defining “satellite jurisdiction” as decisions
approving jurisdiction on “‘single factor’ bases such as consent, waiver, domicile, state of
incorporation, and personal service within the state.”).
117 Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of An Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33,
75 (1978).
118 See, e.g., Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354, 357–58 (1819) (defendant’s “arrest” in
the forum state of Massachusetts sufficed to obtain jurisdiction over him in a civil
partnership dispute, even though the defendant was not a resident of Massachusetts).
119 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878) (“Where a party is within a territory, he
may justly be subjected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced
on such process against him. Where he is not within such territory, and is not personally
subject to its law, if, on account of his supposed or actual property being within the
territory, process by the local laws may, by attachment, go to compel his appearance, and
for his default to appear judgment may be pronounced against him, such a judgment must,
upon general principles, be deemed only to bind him to the extent of such property, and
cannot have the effect of a conclusive judgment in personam . . . .”) (quoting Picquet v.
Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828)).
120 See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) (“Sitting in the lounge of
his plane on a nonstop flight over New York, a citizen of California is handed a summons.
For many years to come, to his great expense and greater annoyance, he will have to defend
a law suit in a New York court three thousand miles away, from his home, even thought
the plaintiff may be a spiteful competitor alleging a fanciful claim dating back many years
to a trip abroad.”); Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over International
Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL.
L. REV. 593.
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holdover from the “power” theory of jurisdiction associated with
Pennoyer and should give way to the “fairness” era ushered in by
International Shoe.121 In a famously aggressive use of it, a lower court
upheld jurisdiction based on service of a defendant on an airplane passing
through the forum state’s airspace.122 Many commentators predicted the
in-state service rule would not survive after the Supreme Court expanded
the minimum contacts test to limit quasi in rem jurisdiction.123
121 Ehrenzweig, supra note 120, at 311–12 (“there seems to be little left of the rule of
Pennoyer v. Neff save the amorphous formula of fair play and substantial justice well
known to use from the law of jurisdiction over corporations. It may well be the in the law
of jurisdiction over individuals, as in that of jurisdiction over foreign corporations, a
substantial “minimum contact” will ultimately be the touchstone of permissible
jurisdiction. The question will then arise whether this formula, whose extreme flexibility
is hardly preferable to the extreme rigidity of the classical rule of physical service, will not
need to be supplemented by criteria within the civilian laws of competency, or, more likely,
within the common law of forum non conveniens.”).
122 Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
123 Daniel O. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of
In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38, 61 (1979–80) (arguing tag jurisdiction
cannot survive Shaffer); E. Merrick Dodd Jr., Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L.
REV. 427, 438 (1929) (writing in 1929 Professor Dodd questioned the validity of tag
jurisdiction:”Not only is there thus reason to doubt the appropriateness in all cases of
conducting litigation in a state which has no relation to the controversy except the fact that
the defendant is temporarily present therein, there is also strong ground for arguing that it
is often highly desirable and altogether appropriate to try a case in a state in which the
defendant may not be present at all.”); Donna Metcalfe Ducey, Note, Lockert v. Breedlove;
The North Carolina Supreme Court Rejects the Minimum Contacts Analysis Under the
“Transient Rule” of Jurisdiction, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1051, 1059–60 (1987) (criticizing North
Carolina Supreme Court for upholding constitutionality of tag jurisdiction); Ehrenzweig,
supra note 120 (criticizing fairness of in-state service rule); Donald W. Fyr, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The Supreme Court’s Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY
L.J. 739, 770 (1977) (stating that “[t]he contacts formula could rarely be satisfied” in cases
involving tag jurisdiction); Stewart Jay, “Minimum Contacts” as a Unified Theory of
Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 474 (1981) (stating that “[w]e
may assume that the Court will restrict ‘tag’ jurisdiction whenever the occasion presents
itself”); Lewis, supra note 116, at 61 (stating that “courts should discard the single factor
jurisdictional basis of ‘tagging’“); Robert Allen Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law in Interstate Accident Cases: The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q. 329, 332 (stating that “Shaffer presumably renders unconstitutional the exercise of
personal jurisdiction based solely on personal service in the forum”); Silberman, supra note
117, at 75 (stating that “if the power theory is rejected altogether [by Shaffer] . . . then the
traditional basis of physical ‘tag’ for serving a defendant within a state . . . would be
constitutionally suspect”); David H. Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 997, 1021 (1978) (stating
that availability of transient jurisdiction is “open to substantial doubt”); David H. Vernon,
Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 303 (availability of transient jurisdiction “doubtful”);
Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State
Courts: Time For Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 492 (1984) (“[t]he traditional basis for
personal jurisdiction that is most vulnerable [after Shaffer] is service on the defendant while
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In 1990 however, in Burnham v. Superior Court,124 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the in-state service rule, though under
a splintered rationale. The four-Justice plurality argued that the rule’s
acceptance at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
sufficed to establish its constitutionality.125 Four Justices concurring in the
judgment argued that the rule’s historical pedigree could not suffice to
demonstrate its constitutionality, but argued that the rule was fair in
operation even for brief visits, such as the Burnham defendant’s three-day
visit to the forum state of California.126 Justice Stevens wrote a brief
concurrence agreeing with both rationales.127
2. Domicile
Before International Shoe, the domicile of an individual defendant
was usually held to be a basis for in personam jurisdiction. State courts
generally so held that as long as there was reasonable notice to the
defendant, either by personally serving him outside the forum state or
leaving the summons and complaint at his usual place of abode within the
forum state.128 The Supreme Court strongly hinted in McDonald v.
Mabee129 that domicile was a constitutionally sufficient basis for
jurisdiction, but there sustained the attack on the judgment there because
notice by publication in a newspaper was inadequate.130 In Blackmer v.
he is transiently present in the forum”). But see Willis L.M. Reese, Shaffer v. Heitner;
Implications for the Doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1978) (stating
that “it is by no means clear that Shaffer v. Heitner declares tag jurisdiction
unconstitutional”); Eric P. Heichel, Note, The Physical Presence Basis of Personal
Jurisdiction Ten Years After Shaffer v. Heitner; A Rule in Search of a Rationale, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 713, 730 (1987) (arguing that tag jurisdiction serves goal of providing
plaintiff with a forum).
124 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
125 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622 (“[A] doctrine of personal jurisdiction that dates back to
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed unquestionably
meets [the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice] standard.”).
126 Id. at 628 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
127 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
128 Hurlburt v. Thomas, 10 A. 556 (Conn. 1887) (abode service); Henderson v.
Staniford, 105 Mass. 504 (1870) (collecting cases allowing domicile as a basis for
jurisdiction); In re Hendrickson, 167 N.W. 172 (S.D. 1918) (personal service outside the
forum); Fernandez v. Casey, 14 S.W. 149 (Tex. 1890). Not all courts took this view,
however. The Iowa Supreme Court in Raher v. Raher, 129 N.W. 494 (Iowa 1911) took the
view that service outside the forum state on a domiciliary did not confer in personam
jurisdiction. The majority opinion purported to be unable to find any cases from other
states on the question, though there clearly were, as pointed out by the dissent. The Iowa
Supreme Court overruled Raher in Edwards v. Smith, 29 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1947).
129
243 U.S. 90 (1917).
130 Id. at 92.
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United States,131 the Court upheld under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment the power of the federal government to punish by
contempt an American who refused to respond to a subpoena, even though
he was not served in the United States. Reasoning by analogy, domicile
is to a state what citizenship is to a nation. The Supreme Court finally
closed the loop in Milliken v. Meyer,132 holding that Wyoming had
jurisdiction over one of its domiciliaries even though he was served in
Colorado.
Domicile continues on as an essentially unchallenged basis for in
personam jurisdiction.133 Interestingly, although referring to the need to
give the domiciliary reasonable notice, the Milliken Court coined the
phrase “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”134 that the
International Shoe Court would quote five years later in formulating the
minimum contacts test.135 The conversion of jurisdiction from a “power”
or “sovereignty” theory to one of fairness was not instantaneous with the
rendering of the International Shoe opinion, nor has it been complete—as
the periodic reemergence of the sovereignty strand in modern opinions
shows.136 So when Justice Holmes in 1917 penned his famous line that
“[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power” he immediately
qualified it by stating that even under the common law’s “conception of
sovereignty” it “required a judgment not to be contrary to natural justice”
and with jurisdictional fictions “great caution should be used not to let
fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close
adhesion to fact.”137
3. Voluntary Appearance and Express Consent
Courts at common law and continuing to today treat the right to
object to personal jurisdiction as waivable. Voluntary appearance without
a timely objection to jurisdiction has long been accepted as a form of

131

284 U.S. 421 (1932).
311 U.S. 457 (1940).
133 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 398. But see RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 209 (5th ed. 2006) (basing
jurisdiction purely on a technical domicile raises fairness questions).
134 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
135 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
136 See, e.g., J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786–87 (“The [Due Process] Clause ‘protect[s]
a person against having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance
with the valid laws of the land’. This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign
to resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a sovereign
to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.”).
137 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
132
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express consent to jurisdiction.138 In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,139 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that a party may, through conduct, forfeit its right to object to
personal jurisdiction. Thus, with regard to voluntary appearance as a basis
for jurisdiction, little has changed, except for an evolution from older
pleading regimes that required a strict “special appearance” to the Federal
Rules model that requires jurisdiction to be raised early in the case, but
strictly as the sole issue that the defendant raises at the case’s outset.140
4. Personal Status
Another satellite basis for jurisdiction is the domicile of any person
whose “personal status” is being changed. This gives courts divorce
jurisdiction to a state in which either party is domiciled141 or to give
jurisdiction to a court in which other status matters such as custody and
competence are being decided.142 The Pennoyer majority opinion
explicitly left status determinations untouched.143 The status basis
survived the transition to the minimum contacts era unscathed.144
5. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
The satellite basis of jurisdiction the minimum contacts regime
undeniably alters is quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the attachment of
property of the defendant unrelated to the litigation. This has been referred
to as the “quasi in rem hold-up.”145 In rem jurisdiction literally involves
jurisdiction over property, and thus any judgment only can affect rights in
the property.146 In cases in which the dispute directly involves the property
138 See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (filing of a counterclaim amounted
to a submission to the court’s jurisdiction); Sugg v. Thorton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889) (finding
that failure to raise a jurisdictional objection by special appearance amounted to a waiver
of jurisdictional objections).
139 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (noting failure to cooperate in jurisdictional discovery); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h) (personal jurisdiction objections waived if not timely raised).
140 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 401.
141 See, e.g., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
142 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 353.
143 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1878) (“To prevent any misapplication of the
views expressed in this opinion, it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by
any thing we have said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the Status
of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the State,
though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident.”).
144 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
145 Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993).
146 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 350.
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– a contest over a decedent’s estate, for instance – it makes perfect sense
to vest jurisdiction in the courts of the state where the property is
located.147
Far more problematic were quasi in rem cases in which the property
itself was not the subject of any dispute, but rather the presence of the
property was simply an excuse to proceed with what was for practical
purposes an in personam action in the state in which the defendant
happened to own property. In fact, Pennoyer was just that sort of case, but
jurisdiction was defeated because the plaintiff failed to attach the property
at the outset of the case.148 Quasi in rem jurisdiction created the possibility
of default judgments taking the property of out-of-state landholders
without any actual notice of the action and no realistic way to mount a
defense. The lack of notice stemmed from the fiction that the property
was “always in the possession of its owner” so that seizure of it would
automatically convey notice.149 Often, procedural statutes required only
likely futile efforts at notice, such as by publication of a copy of the
summons in a local newspaper.150
The possibilities for abuse grew as the use of quasi in rem
jurisdiction expanded from real to intangible property. The most notorious
example was Harris v. Balk, in which a debt owed to a creditor was held
to be property of the creditor and located wherever the debtor went,
allowing the debt to be “attached” by seizing the body of the debtor.151 In
Shaffer v. Heitner,152 the Supreme Court tore down the fiction by holding
that these sorts of quasi in rem cases were nothing more than in personam
actions against the owner of the property.153 The Court therefore held that
the true defendant, the property owner, could be subject to jurisdiction in
147

Id.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
149 Id. at 727 (“The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner,
in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform him, not
only that it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to any proceedings
authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale.”).
150 See, e.g., id. at 721 (“The majority of the court are also of opinion that the provision
of the statute requiring proof of the publication in a newspaper to be made by the ‘affidavit
of the printer, or his foreman, or his principal clerk,’ is satisfied when the affidavit is made
by the editor of the paper.”); Webster v. Reid, 1 Morris 467 (Iowa 1846) (affirming a lower
court’s decision with regards to the validity of an Iowa statute allowing for notice in a local
publication, in this case eight weeks notice of action against a land owner through
publication in the “Iowa Teritorial [sic] Gazette”); Brown v. Woods’ & Crump’s Heirs, 29
Ky. 11, 15 (1831) (“the acts of Assembly tolerating proceedings against absent defendants
and unknown heirs, upon constructive notice by publication, must be strictly observed.”).
151 198 U.S. 215, 222–23 (1905).
152
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
153 Id. at 212.
148
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the forum state only if he had minimum contacts with it.154 The practical
effect of Shaffer was to collapse quasi in rem jurisdiction into in personam
jurisdiction, because if the property owner has minimum contacts with the
forum, he is subject to in personam jurisdiction, which has the advantage
that the judgment is not limited to the property.155
International Shoe is often thought to have liberalized state-court
jurisdiction.156 But at least with satellite bases of jurisdiction, the
minimum contacts era effected only one significant change, and that was
to contract state-court jurisdiction by essentially eliminating quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdiction in Tort Actions
Jurisdiction in tort actions is a bit harder to gauge because substantive
tort law has changed greatly since the pre-International Shoe era and
technological innovations have made multistate torts easier to commit. Of
the tort jurisdictional cases decided in the minimum contacts era, four have
been product liability cases (all holding that there was no jurisdiction),157
two were libel actions based on statements made in nationally circulated
publications (both concluding that there was jurisdiction),158 one was a
negligence case in which the plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to assert
jurisdiction based on unrelated contacts,159 one pled a potpourri of tort
theories but jurisdiction was unsuccessfully asserted based on unrelated
contacts,160 and one was a constitutional tort case—akin to conversion or
trespass to chattels—in which the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’
home state did not have jurisdiction because the tortious conduct took
place elsewhere.161

154

Id. (“all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”).
155
HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 353.
156 See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
157 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857; J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2791; Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980).
158 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783 (1983).
159 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984).
160 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2014).
161 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2014). The Supreme Court also decided
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). But there the attempted exercise of jurisdiction was
based on a quasi in rem theory, which the Court rejected as being barred by Shaffer’s
requirement that the true defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state.
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In many of these cases, no pre-International Shoe analog exists.
Product liability theory was is in its infancy when International Shoe was
decided. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,162 Judge Cardozo writing for
New York’s high court dispensed with the “privity” requirement and
allowed a consumer to sue a manufacturer for a negligently designed or
manufactured product.163 However, modern product liability law was not
born until the California Supreme Court’s decision in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products164—decided eighteen years after International Shoe –
allowed plaintiffs to proceed on a strict liability theory. Multistate
defamation was not unknown in the pre-International Shoe days, but the
technological capacity to distribute publications nationally was not as
readily available as it is today, to say nothing of the Internet’s ability to
spread a message worldwide with a few keystrokes on a computer.165 As
automobiles became the prevalent means of transportation, the likelihood
of residents of different states being involved in negligence actions
increased dramatically, but the pre-International Shoe Supreme Court
handled this issue sensibly by upholding the constitutionality of
nonresident motorist statutes.166
In the well-known case of Hess v. Pawloski,167 the defendant was a
Pennsylvania motorist who, while driving in Massachusetts, collided with
a Massachusetts motorist.168 The Massachusetts motorist brought suit in
his home state against the other driver and asserted jurisdiction under a
Massachusetts statute providing that nonresident motorists driving on
Massachusetts roads were deemed to have appointed the Massachusetts
Secretary of State as their agent for service of process.169 The statute
required the plaintiff to serve the Secretary and pay a fee and the Secretary
was then in turn required to send a copy of the summons to the nonresident
defendant by registered mail.170 The scheme paid homage to Pennoyer’s
territorialism by requiring a physical act of service of process to take place
within the forum state, but for practical purposes it was service by mail.171
Although modern long-arm statutes allow for service outside the state
162

111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
Id. at 1157.
164 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
165 See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002); Young v. New Haven
Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Griffs v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).
166 See Hess v. Pawloski 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 353.
169 Id. at 354.
170 Id.
171
Id. at 355 (“The process of a court of one State cannot run into another and summon
a party there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him.”).
163
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(often by registered mail) without the need to serve a constructive agent of
the defendant,172 it is still common for states to require foreign
corporations to appoint an in-state agent to accept process as a condition
of doing in-state business, and if they fail to do so to be deemed to have
appointed a state official as their agent.173
The U.S. Supreme Court sensibly upheld the Massachusetts
statute.174 Foreshadowing International Shoe’s fairness language, the
Court pointed to the relative position of the parties; “The measure in
question operates to require a non-resident to answer for his conduct in the
state where arise causes of action alleged against him, as well as to provide
for a claimant a convenient method by which he may sue to enforce his
rights.”175 Although the Court resorted to the dubious fiction of “implied
consent” of the nonresident motorist to sustain the statute,176 the rationale
has a modern feel; in fact it is an improvement over the rationales offered
up in the most recent cases.
Although this article does not quarrel with the result in the much
more recent Walden decision, the Court’s strenuous efforts there to banish
from the jurisdictional calculus any consideration of the plaintiff’s interest
in obtaining a convenient forum were quite stunning.177 As it has been
noted,178 the practical effect of the J. McIntyre decision was to deprive a
U.S. plaintiff of any realistic forum in the name of giving a foreign
manufacturer jurisdictional protection that it would not receive in its own
nation’s courts.179 The Hess Court’s recognition of the need of the plaintiff
to have a reasonable forum is a veritable breath of fresh air contrasted with
the exclusive defendant focus of those modern decisions.
Negligence involving railroads also presented the possibility of
multistate tort actions. One example is Simon v. Southern Railway Co.180
172 See, e.g. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(3) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634–35(b) (2002); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.510.130 (2011).
173 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52–59(B)(c) (1971); IOWA CODE § 617.3 (2003); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 4:4–4(A)(6) (West 2003).
174 Hess, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (“Due process limits on the State’s
adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the
convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”).
178 Borchers, supra note 46, at 12; J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the
Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 18, at 1246; Yeargan, supra note
18.
179 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a disadvantage in
comparison to similarly situated complainant elsewhere in the world.”).
180 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
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In that case, defendant’s railroad in Alabama allegedly injured the
plaintiff, the plaintiff attempted to assert jurisdiction in the Louisiana
courts on the grounds that the defendant was doing business in the forum
state.181 Turning away the plaintiff’s efforts to enforce a judgment against
the railroad, the Court presaged what today would be called the division
between specific and general jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the
question of whether an employee of the railroad could be treated as an
agent for service of process, the Court stated that this question depends on
how the claim “relates to business and transactions within the jurisdiction
of the state enacting the [service of process] law.”182 Shortly thereafter,
the Court reasoned: “the statutory consent of a foreign corporation to be
sued does not extend to causes of action arising in other states.”183
In modern parlance, the lack of related forum contacts defeated any
claim to specific jurisdiction, and the foreign corporation (and thus
presumably not “at home” as the Court has recently defined that phrase)
doomed any attempt to assert general jurisdiction.184 Again to use modern
terminology, the Court was worried that merely conducting unrelated
business could subject the railroad to forum shopping. If doing unrelated
business in the forum state sufficed, it would require the defendant to
defend “claims on contracts wherever made and suits for torts wherever
committed . . . .”185 The clear implication of the Court’s rationale was that
it would have allowed the plaintiff to proceed in the injury state of
Alabama.186
Defamation cases occasionally arose between citizens of different
states. In Goldey v. Morning News,187 a New York plaintiff brought in
New York an action against corporation publishing The Morning News of
New Haven, which was described in the Court’s syllabus as “carrying on
business in [Connecticut] only.”188 Tellingly, the plaintiff only attempted
to justify jurisdiction under New York’s “Pope”189 rule which allowed for
in personam jurisdiction over a corporate defendant based merely on
service of process on a corporate officer while in the state, even if only
181

Id. at 128–29.
Id. at 130.
183 Id.
184 Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
185 Id.
186 Id. See generally St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913)
(suit for negligence with regard to allowing perishables to spoil allowed in state where
shipment ended).
187 156 U.S. 518 (1895).
188
Id.
189 See Pope v. Terre Haute Co., 87 N.Y. 137 (N.Y. 1881).
182
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briefly and for reasons unrelated to corporate business. The Court ruled
that the lower court did not have jurisdiction.190
While tort cases did not make up a large portion of the preInternational Shoe Supreme Court opinions dealing with jurisdictional
questions, the Court’s handling of them was sensible. In fact, the Court
appeared to have created a jurisdictional equivalent of the lex loci delicti
– meaning the law of the place of injury191—rule in choice of law, which
was to give jurisdiction to the plaintiff in the place of the injury. While it
is impossible to know whether the Court would have stuck to this rule had
it retained its pre-International Shoe jurisprudence, such a rule would have
given the plaintiffs jurisdiction in their chosen forums in World-Wide
Volkswagen and J. McIntyre, two of the most controversial, and deeply
divided, opinions of the minimum contacts era. A place-of-the-injury rule
would also accord with the European Union’s rule, which – as the dissent
noted – would have applied to the J. McIntyre defendant had the case been
brought in an E.U. court.192
C. “Doing Business” Jurisdiction
The most important, yet tangled, pre-International Shoe basis was
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations “doing business” in the state.
Jurisdiction was rationalized in various ways. Sometimes the Court said
that a corporation doing business in the forum state manifested a
“presence” there (akin to an individual being present in the forum state and
thus being capable of being served with process).193 Other times, the Court
reasoned that the corporation had implicitly consented to jurisdiction
because a state could bar foreign corporations and thus extract from them
an appointment of an in-state agent for service of process as a condition of
doing business.194
While the “doing business” decisions of the pre-International Shoe
Court turned on fine distinctions, the opinions usually reached fair results.
Indeed they are notable for their express invocation of the importance of
190

Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 525 (1895).
See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 807 (Ala. 1892).
192 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“within the European Union . . . . the jurisdiction New Jersey would have
exercised is not at all exceptional. The European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments provides for the exercise of specific
jurisdiction ‘in matters relating to tort . . . . in the courts for the place where the harmful
event occurred.’” (quoting Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L. 12))).
193 See, e.g., Consol. Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 (1933).
194
See, e.g., Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 315 (1943); St. Louis
Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226 (1913).
191
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the plaintiff having at least one relatively convenient forum in which to
sue the defendant. For example, in an opinion involving a policyholder
suing an out-of-state insurer, the Court in sustaining jurisdiction in the
policyholder’s home state said that the forum state’s “interest may be
measured by highly realistic considerations such as the protection of the
citizen insured or the protection of the state from the incidents of loss.”195
Such reasoning is a marked contrast from the current Court’s rigid
insistence in J. McIntyre and Walden that the plaintiff is irrelevant to the
jurisdictional calculus.
Within the “doing business” opinions there existed a clearly defined
line between what today we call specific and general jurisdiction.196
Corporations were held to be “doing business” only if the cause of action
arose in the forum state.197 In cases in which a corporate defendant only
did unrelated business, the corporation was not subject to jurisdiction.198
These pre-International Shoe decisions anticipated the current doctrine
that a corporation’s contacts must be so weighty as to make it “at home”
in the forum to subject it to general jurisdiction.199 Unchallenged was the
right of a plaintiff to sue a corporation in its state of incorporation, but to
sue it anywhere else required related contacts.200
The pre-International Shoe decisions were not perfect and presented
some difficult issues of predictability. A thorny issue was the line between
“mere solicitation” and solicitation plus other activities.201 In cases in
which a corporation engaged in more than mere solicitation, the Court held
it subject to jurisdiction.202 In cases in which there was no more than that,
the corporation was not subject to jurisdiction.203 As the Court put it;
“Each case depends on its own facts.”204

195

Hoopeston, 318 U.S. at 316.
See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 1930).
197 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Lumbermen’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407,
414 (1905).
198 See generally, Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
199 Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (“A
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State
are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State.”).
200 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Lumbermen’s, 197 U.S. at 414.
201 See, e.g., International Harvester Co. of Am. v. Ky., 234 U.S. 579, 587 (1914).
202 See, e.g., Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen,, 318 U.S. 313, 317; Int’l Harvester, 234
U.S. 579; Pa. Lumbermen’s, 197 U.S. at 414–15.
203 See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co., Ltd. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 86–88
(1918); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930).
204 People’s Tobacco, 246 U.S. at 87.
196
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Set in this context, International Shoe looks less like a radical break
from its immediate past than an effort to make sense out of the “doing
business” cases. Against this backdrop, the International Shoe result
finding jurisdiction appears consistent with then-existing law. Although
the defendant shoe corporation tried to bring itself within the “mere
solicitation” rule and avoid jurisdiction, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that its roughly one dozen salesmen working throughout the state of
Washington was a sufficient connection with the forum state.205 The
Washington Supreme Court had reached the same conclusion.206
The International Shoe Court seemed to have several goals. One was
to bring the “presence” and “consent” fictions under one roof.207 Another
was to put to rest the distinction between ‘mere solicitation and ‘more than
mere solicitation,’208 a distinction that closely resembles the ongoing split
between the “resale” and the “resale plus” tests in the Supreme Court’s
stream-of-commerce jurisprudence.209 Next, the Court made explicit what
had emerged in the earlier “doing business” cases, which was that
plaintiffs whose claims arose out of the corporation’s forum-state
activities stood in a much stronger position than those making claims
based on unrelated activities.210 Finally, by quoting Milliken’s “fair play
and substantial justice” language, and adopting Judge Learned Hand’s test
of an “estimate of the inconveniences,”211 the Court made basic fairness
the guiding light of constitutional limitations on state-court jurisdiction.
It is far from clear that the International Shoe Court meant to offer a
grand unifying theory of judicial jurisdiction. International Shoe tied

205

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945) (“Appellant also insists that its
activities within the state were not sufficient to manifest its ‘presence’ there and that in its
absence the state courts were without jurisdiction, that consequently it was a denial of due
process for the state to subject appellant to suit. It refers to those cases in which it was said
that the mere solicitation of orders for the purchase of goods within a state, to be accepted
without the state and filled by shipment of the purchased goods interstate, does not render
the corporation seller amenable to suit within the state.”).
206 Int’l Shoe Co. v. State, 154 P.2d 801 (Wash. 1945), aff’d, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
207 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (“‘Presence’ in the state in this sense has never been
doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued
or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.”).
208 Id. at 316.
209 J. McIntyre Mach., Ld. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(referring to the “dueling” opinions in Asahi with regard to the stream-of-commerce test).
210 Int’l Shoe, 154 P.2d at 820 (holding that the corporations operations within the state
of Washington established enough contacts with the forum state to make it reasonable for
the forum state to enforce the obligations that International Shoe had incurred there, and
refusing to find that the contacts with the state were unrelated), aff’d, 326 U.S. 310.
211 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17.
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together the various strands of the “doing business” test as applied to
corporate defendants. But whether the Court did much beyond that is
uncertain. In the next Supreme Court case to present a jurisdictional issue,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,212 the Court did not mention the
minimum contacts test. It was not until twelve years after International
Shoe that the Court expressly mentioned the minimum contacts test.
It did so in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,213 but in a factual
context that marked so many of the “doing business” cases—a
policyholder suing an out-of-state insurance company to make good on a
claim.214 In retrospect, McGee is remarkable for its solicitude of the
plaintiff-policyholder by noting that failing to give her a home-state forum
would likely make litigation against the defendant impracticable,215 but the
need to give the plaintiff at least one realistic forum was one of the
important threads that the Supreme Court had tied together in the
International Shoe opinion.
From this high water mark for the fairness rationale, the water has
receded. And the water has receded to a level that looks remarkably like
the pre-International Shoe shoreline, or perhaps sits a bit below it.
III. A MODEST PROPOSAL
In his 1980 dissent from World-Wide and its companion case,216
Justice Brennan wrote that the minimum contacts decisions “may already
be obsolete as constitutional boundaries.”217 Justice Brennan argued that
the exclusive focus on defendant contacts, without any exploration of any
actual inconvenience to the defendant and the need of plaintiff to have
access to a forum, undercut the International Shoe rationale of fairness and
212

339 U.S. 306 (1950).
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
214 Id. (“Lowell Franklin, a resident of California, purchased a life insurance policy
from the Empire Mutual Insurance Company, an Arizona corporation. In 1948
[International Life Insurance Co.] agreed with Empire Mutual to assume its insurance
obligations. [International Life Insurance Co.] then mailed a reinsurance certificate to
Franklin in California offering to insure him in accordance with the terms of the policy he
held with Empire Mutual . . . .Petitioner, Franklin’s mother, was the beneficiary under the
policy. She sent proofs of his death to the [International Life Insurance Co.] but it refused
to pay claiming that he had committed suicide.”).
215 Id. at 223 (“These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced
to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.
When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the
cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum—thus in effect making the company judgment
proof.”).
216 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
217
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
213
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reasonableness.218 The point of determining whether there are contacts
between the defendant and the forum is not a valuable exercise on its own,
but rather a proxy for fairness to the defendant. But by any rational
calculus courts must evaluate fairness to the plaintiff, in particular when
the plaintiff chooses to sue at home or at the situs of the injury and thus is
not engaging in any obvious forum shopping.219 Recently, however, the
Court has evaluated contacts as if they are important for their own sake,
while denying the relevance of other considerations.220 While Brennan
was a voice in the wilderness in 1980, his warning that a pure defendant
focus would distort the basic fairness rationale of International Shoe
proved prophetic.
It is unlikely that the Court will abandon the minimum contacts
language in the foreseeable future. However, as we have seen, the
minimum contacts test as currently applied is at best a trivial improvement
over the regime of the fictions of “implied consent” and “presence” that
pre-dated International Shoe, and in some ways less flexible.221 As
applied, the minimum contacts test defies predictability to the point that
the Court often cannot generate a majority opinion.222 Moreover, the Court
has vacillated as to the theoretical underpinnings of the test, such as
whether state sovereignty is an independent factor – all the while siding
with defendants against plaintiffs who clearly were not forum shopping.223
The problem stems from the fact that jurisdictional due process is a
constitutional orphan.224 The minimum contacts test is not an application
of substantive due process or the Court presumably would apply some
variant of the rationality test.225 Jurisdictional due process more resembles

218

Id. at 300.
Id.
220 See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
221
See supra notes 189–212 and accompanying text.
222 See, e.g., J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780; Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604
(1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
223 See, e.g., J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (“Freeform notions of fundamental fairness
divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the absence of
authority into law.”); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982); World Wide, 444 U.S. at 293 (“ . . . we have never accepted
the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and
remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.”).
224 Patrick J. Borchers, Jones v. Flowers: An Essay on a Unified Theory of Procedural
Due Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 343 (2007).
225 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Railroad Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980);
219
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procedural due process; however, that branch of due process jurisprudence
divides into the requirements of “fair procedure”226 and “fair notice.”227
Jurisdictional due process could be wrapped in with those strands of
due process jurisprudence if the minimum contacts test were replaced with
– or at least subordinated to – the Asahi balancing test or something like
it.228 However, in the four most recent minimum contacts opinions, the
Asahi balancing test was mentioned only in Justice Sotomayor’s lonely
concurrence in the judgment in Daimler,229 leaving in doubt whether the
Court will continue to apply the Asahi test, and making it more unlikely
still that it will supplant minimum contacts as the primary determinant.
The grudging reasoning and results in the specific jurisdiction cases
would be less problematic but for the Court’s determination to rein in
general jurisdiction to the point that defendants are subject to contactsbased general jurisdiction in only one – or at most a very few – forums.
Nothing could have made this clearer than resting Daimler on the rationale
that fulfillment of the test for general jurisdiction depends not only on the
substantiality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, but also their
proportionality to contacts in other states.230 As a policy choice, this may
well be a sensible one. Opening up large-scale enterprises to jurisdiction
in all fifty states promotes forum shopping.231 But contracting general
jurisdiction while leaving plaintiffs who are injured in, and sue in, their
home states’ courts with no access to a realistic forum is both bizarre and
unfair.232
Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348
U.S. 483 (1955).
226 United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979); Matthews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
227 See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950).
228 Jones v. Flowers: An Essay on a Unified Theory of Procedural Due Process, supra
note 219, at 349 (“One of the important developments in this line of cases has been the
growth of an independent reasonableness test alongside the requirement of minimum
contacts. This reasonableness test involves the weighing of five factors, which are “‘the
burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,’ and the
‘shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.’”)
229 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
230 Id. at 760.
231 See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (employing the federal venue
transfer statute to shop for a forum against a national manufacturer of farm equipment).
232 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2801–02 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Courts, both state and federal, confronting facts similar to those here, have
rightly rejected the conclusion that a manufacturer selling its products across the USA may
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The difficulty is that the Court continues to attempt to make policy
judgments better handled by legislation than episodic bursts of confusing
jurisdictional opinions. Some commentators have praised the Court’s
campaign to limit assertions of contacts-based general jurisdiction.233 As
a policy matter, plaintiffs ought not to have a virtually unlimited menu of
forum choices. But the Court’s efforts to decide, through constitutional
litigation, what is on the menu is a failed project thus far. If the Court
cannot produce majority opinions in common circumstances such as
product suits in which the injury-causing product is sold in the forum, it is
a tall order to ask lawyers and lower courts to predict results.
A plaintiff with a cause of action under state law has a property right
subject to protection under the Due Process Clause.234 In the J. McIntyre
case, the plaintiff’s property right was summarily extinguished in the name
of protecting a foreign defendant from the perceived unfairness of having
to defend in New Jersey.235 In World-Wide, the plaintiffs were prohibited
from pursuing all of the defendants in Oklahoma – the situs of the accident
– even though the majority admitted that the forum state might well be the
most convenient forum for all concerned.236 In Shaffer v. Heitner,237 the
plaintiff was prohibited from pursuing a shareholders’ derivative action in
Delaware, even though the corporation was there incorporated.238 Yet in
evade jurisdiction in any and all States, including the State where its defective product is
distributed and causes injury. They have held, instead, that it would undermine principles
of fundamental fairness to insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court
at the place within the United States where the manufacturer’s products caused injury.”);
J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test,
supra note 18, at 1246; Adam M. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three
Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 505–06 (2012);
see also Borchers, supra note 18, at 1111–14 (noting fairness concerns raised by J.
McIntyre decision and suggesting that the Court adopt a doctrine of “nonspecific
purposeful availment” in which intentional efforts to serve the U.S. market would suffice
without a need to show targeting of any particular state).
233 See e.g., Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE
FOREST. L. REV. 999, 1081 (2012); Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction
After Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549, 572–73 (2012).
234 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (“[A] chose in
action is a constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the
plaintiffs.”).
235 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2800–01.
236 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (“Even if
the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate
before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location
for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”).
237
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
238 Id.
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Keeton v. Hustler,239 the Court tolerated blatant forum shopping as the
plaintiff was allowed to pursue a libel suit against a national publication
in New Hampshire, a state with which she had no apparent connection
because it was the only state in which the statute of limitations had not yet
expired.240
These are symptoms that show that the minimum contacts test is very
ill, perhaps terminally so. It produces helter-skelter results. The Court
vacillates on the theoretical justification for limiting jurisdiction. The
Court often decides cases without a majority opinion. As it is now
functioning, the minimum contacts test is little or no improvement over
the “patchwork of legal and factual fictions”241 from which it supposedly
liberated civil actions.
I have made sweeping proposals in the past. In 1990, I suggested
that the Supreme Court get out of the business of attempting to regulate
state-court jurisdiction.242 I argued that the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause was implicated only if the defendant’s opportunity to defend the
case was meaningfully compromised.243 In the case that the subject of my
attention then – Burnham v. Superior Court 244 – I noted that the question
at stake was whether the property aspect of the divorce case there would
be litigated in the husband’s home state of New Jersey or the wife’s home
state of California.245 Either way, one party was going to be
inconvenienced, and I could see no constitutional justification for
preferring one party to the other.246

239

465 U.S. 770, 773 (1984).
Id.
241 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219–20 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
((“I join Parts I-III of the Court’s opinion. I fully agree that the minimum-contacts analysis
developed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, represents a far more sensible
construct for the exercise of state-court jurisdiction than the patchwork of legal and factual
fictions that has been generated from the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff. It is precisely
because the inquiry into minimum contacts is now of such overriding importance . . . ”)
(citations omitted)).
242 Borchers, supra note 7, at 103.
243 Borchers, supra note 7,at 99 (“Perhaps there are some cases in which a defendant is
put to the test of defending or defaulting, and it is economically rational for the defendant
to make a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This much, however, should
be clear: if there are such cases, they are few and far between. Such a motion should require
a defendant to show a practical inability to defend. Beyond that, a defendant must show
the availability of some other forum in which the plaintiff can meaningfully pursue the
claim. Unless the defendant can make that additional showing, dismissal is nothing more
than trading one constitutional deprivation for another.)
244 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
245
Borchers, supra note 7, at 97–98.
246 Id. at 99.
240
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I still believe this to be the best solution. By dramatically pulling
back the boundaries of constitutional regulation of jurisdiction, states
would be forced to draft meaningful long arm statutes.247 Statutes in
general do a better job of promoting predictability. In the related area of
choice of law, when Louisiana switched from judicially created “interest
analysis” to statutory choice-of-law rules the affirmance rate of lower
courts (a reasonably proxy for predictability) increased dramatically.248
The problem is that Supreme Court abandonment of the field is not likely
to happen. The last Justice to call for rejection of the minimum contacts
test was Justice Brennan in his 1980 dissent in World-Wide.249
A more modest suggestion was to unite jurisdictional due process
with procedural due process by adopting the Mathews v. Eldridge250
balancing test for jurisdictional due process.251 Mathews requires courts
to evaluate the constitutional need for more elaborate procedures – such
as live testimony – by balancing the cost of the additional procedure, the
private party’s interest in the matter and the degree to which the additional
procedure will contribute to an accurate result.252
The Asahi
reasonableness test is the Mathews test in different clothing.253 Either the
247 Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to
Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 473 (2004).
248 Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana’s Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical
Observations Regarding Decisional Predictibility, 60 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2000)
(noting that in pre-codification cases the affirmance rate was 52.9%, but for postcodification decisions, the affirmance rate improved to 76.2%).
249 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“Because I believe that the Court reads International Shoe and its progeny
too narrowly, and because I believe that the standards enunciated by those cases may
already be obsolete as constitutional boundaries, I dissent.”).
250 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
251 Id.
252 Id. at 347–48 (“In striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor to be
assessed is the public interest. This includes the administrative burden and other societal
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an
evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability
benefits . . . . Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due
process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision.
But the Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and
administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an
additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society
in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost . . . .
The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional system,
judicial-type procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.”).
253 Borchers, supra note 224, at 349 ((“This reasonableness test involves the weighing
of five factors, which are ‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
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reasonableness test could replace the minimum contacts test or it could
become the primary test, with minimum contacts acting only as a safety
valve, as opposed to vice versa.254
This proposal faces long odds now. Since the Court unveiled the
Asahi reasonableness test in 1987, the only opinion applying it has been
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in the judgment in Daimler.255 Every
other opinion in the four most recent cases ignored it. Thus, far from
appearing poised to supplant the minimum contacts test, the Asahi test may
well no longer exist.
This Article advances an even-more-modest proposal; In specific
jurisdiction cases in which the liability-creating events take place in the
United States, the plaintiff should be given at least one reasonable forum.
To understand how modest this proposal is, it appeared to be the law both
before the creation of the minimum contacts test and for a good while after.
In McGee, the Court expressly invoked the consideration that if unable to
sue the insurer at home, the policyholder might be left without any
practical redress.256 In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,257 the Court stated
that the plaintiff’s need for a forum might allow for an assertion of
jurisdiction on a lesser showing of purposeful contacts that ordinarily
needed. In the pre-International Shoe days, the Court was not shy about

substantive social policies.’ This test is the Mathews test recast for the issue of the choice
of a state forum. The elements of the test that include the burden on the defendant and the
plaintiff’s interest are essentially the costs to those parties of various forum choices. If the
parties differ as to the appropriate forum, then these factors should point toward the forum
that is the least burdensome in the aggregate to all of the parties. This is essentially the
Mathews test’s required balancing of the cost of providing an additional procedure against
the value of the claimant’s interest.”) (footnote omitted)).
254 Borchers, supra note 224, at 352 (“The Court could thus substantially unify
procedural due process either by abandoning the minimum contacts test in favor of the
five-factor reasonableness test or, perhaps, subordinating the minimum contacts
requirement to the reasonableness test. Under current doctrine, the minimum contacts test
is the primary one with reasonableness acting as a secondary check. If the Court reversed
the priority of the two, it would go a good distance toward completing the much-needed
unification of procedural due process”).
255 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (holding that she would decide Daimler under the reasonableness test
because “[t]he same considerations resolve this case.”).
256 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (“It cannot be denied that
California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents
when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage
if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it
legally accountable. When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently
could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum—thus in effect making
the company judgment proof.”).
257 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
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invoking the need for insurance policyholders258 and resident motorists259
to have access to a home forum.
This “highly realistic” factor – as the Court has referred to it260—was
present in International Shoe’s rationale.261 But of late, the J. McIntyre
plurality attempted to mutate the contacts test into an inquiry into a state’s
sovereign authority.262 More recently, in Walden, the Court found the
plaintiffs’ interests to be inconsequential and – confusingly – wrote that
defendants’ contacts with forum-resident persons are irrelevant.263
The silver lining is that the Court still has room to take into account
the plaintiff’s need for at least one reasonable forum. The J. McIntyre
plurality opinion is not controlling; the two-vote concurrence in the
judgment is.264 Because the concurrence did not adopt the sovereignty
dogma of the plurality, it is not binding on lower courts. In Walden, much
of the troublesome language is dictum. The plaintiffs there surely could
have sued in Georgia where the money was seized.265 There was no
compelling need there to give the plaintiffs a jurisdictional bonus and
allow them to sue at home in Nevada simply on the hypothesis that the
defendant knew they lived there.266 Moreover, in jurisdictional opinions
the Court has shown a remarkable facility for tiptoeing away from illconsidered language. The most obvious example was after having written
in World-Wide that the needs of interstate federalism could defeat the
plaintiff’s forum choice even if it proved to be the most convenient,267 two

258

Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943).
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
260 Hoopeston, 318 U.S. at 316.
261 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (“An ‘estimate of the inconveniences’
which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place
of business is relevant in this connection.”).
262 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011).
263 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014).
264
Williams v. Romarm, S.A., No. 13-7022, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12368, at *1–2
(D.C. Cir. July 1, 2014) (“Justice Breyer’s narrow concurrence addressed the precise issue
we face today and concluded a foreign corporation’s sale to a distributor, without more, is
insufficient to establish the minimum contacts necessary for a court to exert personal
jurisdiction over the corporation, even if its product ultimately causes injury in the forum
state.”).
265 Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115. Among the likely bases for jurisdiction, it seems virtually
certain that the defendant was domiciled in Georgia. See Milliken, 311 U.S. 457.
266 Id. at 1125 (“Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with
Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had
Nevada connections. Such reasoning improperly attributes a plaintiff’s forum connections
to the defendant and makes those connections ‘decisive’ in the jurisdictional analysis.”).
267
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (“ . . . even if the
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting
259
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years later – in an opinion that same Justice wrote – the Court overruled
itself and said that sovereignty concerns were not part of the jurisdictional
calculus.268
This proposed rule giving the plaintiff at least one reasonable forum
would call for re-examination of the results in only two Supreme Court
cases. One is J. McIntyre. There is no rational justification for preventing
a forum-resident plaintiff, injured in his home state by a machine that
arrived in that state due to the marketing efforts of a foreign defendant,
from suing at home.269 In the name of ensuring due process to the foreign
defendant, the Court effectively extinguished the plaintiff’s cause of action
with no process.270
The other is World-Wide Volkswagen. World-Wide is perhaps closer
than J. McIntyre. New York – where the plaintiffs bought the car – might
have sufficed as a forum, because the dealer and the distributor (whom the
Supreme Court found not to have contacts with the injury state of
Oklahoma) might have had jurisdiction over all four defendants,
particularly given that the defendants at the top of the distribution chain
(the manufacturer and importer) abandoned their efforts to be dismissed
from the Oklahoma action, thus essentially conceding that they were
subject to general jurisdiction there.271 However, under Goodyear the
defendants at the top of the distribution chain would be foolish to concede
general jurisdiction under the “essentially at home” test.272 Moreover,
Oklahoma contained all of the physical evidence and New York was no
longer the plaintiffs’ home.273 The defendants had no apparent desire to
litigate the case in New York. The true purpose of dismissing the two
defendants at the end of the distribution chain was to create full diversity

as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power
to render a valid judgment.”).
268
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
n.10 (1982) (“The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.”).
269 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, (2011).
270 Id.
271 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288 n.3 (“Volkswagen also entered a special appearance in
the District Court, but unlike World-Wide and Seaway did not seek review in the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma and is not a petitioner here. Both Volkswagen and Audi remain as
defendants in the litigation pending before the District Court in Oklahoma.”).
272 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
273
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288 (noting that petitioners were en route to their new home
in Arizona when the accident occurred).
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of citizenship and remove the case to the more defendant-friendly
Oklahoma federal court.274
This modest proposal would not call for a different result in either
Goodyear or Daimler. The facts as pled in both cases are tragic.
Nevertheless, acting outside of the United States carries some risk, and not
having the availability of a U.S. forum is one of them, hence the limitation
of the proposal to specific, not general, jurisdiction cases.
Although the following cases are not wrong as a matter of due
process, some Supreme Court minimum contacts cases upholding
jurisdiction could have been decided the other way without doing violence
to this modest proposal. In Burger King, the plaintiff – a large national
fast food chain – reasonably could have sued its franchisee where it was
doing business, rather than at the plaintiff’s Florida headquarters.275 In the
defamation cases, Calder and Keeton, the plaintiffs there had other
available forums, notably the headquarters of the offending publications.
However, the Calder plaintiff’s desire to sue at home where her reputation
was besmirched was easy to understand. The Keeton plaintiff, however,
had no connection to the forum state of New Hampshire; she was clearly
forum shopping for a long statute of limitations.276
In the end, the modest proposal to give the plaintiff’s a reasonable
domestic forum when the liability-creating events occur in the United
States would do little violence to the results in the post-International Shoe
cases. But it would restore International Shoe’s promise that jurisdiction
rests on “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”277

274 It worked. See Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson—The
Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122 (1993). It clearly would not work now, as diversity
removal is prohibited in cases that have been pending in state court more than a year. See
28 U.S.C. § 1446(c). There also was case law at the time World-Wide was decided that
prohibited removal if the dismissal was for a reason that was not voluntary on the plaintiffs’
part. See, e.g., Debry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1979).
275 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985). Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783, 788–89 (1983) (“The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a
California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television
career was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the
brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her
professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point
both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper
in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.”).
276 See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is our Need for a Judgments-Recognition
Convention and What Should we Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 167,
198 (1998).
277 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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CONCLUSION
The daylight has been dimming for the minimum contacts test since
the Court’s 1980 decision in World-Wide Volkswagen. There the Court
rejected the notion that forum convenience was necessarily central to the
jurisdictional calculus and revived state sovereignty as a critical element,
which was in tension with International Shoe’s emphasis on the fairness
and reasonableness of the chosen forum. Though the Court attempted to
back away from the sovereignty language in World-Wide, the damage was
done because the Court didn’t repudiate either World-Wide’s result or its
exclusive focus on the defendant. With the Court’s current campaign to
roll back corporate general jurisdiction to one or a very few forums, some
plaintiffs are certain to be left without a practical forum in which to pursue
cases even when the liability-creating events took place in the United
States; indeed this is precisely what happened to the J. McIntyre plaintiff.
As a result, we are left with a rigid jurisdictional structure that looks
remarkably like the nineteenth and early twentieth century structure that
the Court claimed to have torn down to erect the minimum contacts test.
Perhaps even jurisdictional doctrine is now more rigid than ever. Some of
those pre-minimum contacts decision seem now remarkable for their
solicitude of the plaintiff’s need to find a reasonable forum, the very
consideration that the Court has sought to banish in its four recent
jurisdictional opinions. While there is no reason to think that the Supreme
Court will abandon the minimum contacts language, as a test it is now
barely recognizable. If the law of personal jurisdiction is to be regrounded in the promise of fair play and substantial justice that was the
foundation of the minimum contacts test, the Court must end its exclusive
focus on defendants and ensure that plaintiffs have at least one reasonable
forum to pursue civil cases in which the liability-creating events occur in
the United States.

